从该PPT中我们可以看到：
1、核电厂实际上做了非常周密的针对异常和极端天气情况下的设计以及应急准备预案。
2、核电系统的经验反馈和持续改进是核安全业绩提升重要工具。核电行业是一个互相学习提升的行业。
3、核电行业是一个信息透明度非常高的行业。桑迪台风之后，国内新闻当时对此不了解，报道了大量不属实的信息，本人当时还专门针对此撰写了一篇博文以澄清事实，详见：http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/55e07e6401017ldt。
后附PSEG公司应对2012年飓风桑迪的一个经验反馈PPT原文/译文（初稿，未校正，欢迎拍砖指正），如下：
In the Eye of the Hurricane: Super Storm Sandy PSEG Nuclear Preparations, Impacts and Lessons Learned
题目：飓风眼中：超级台风桑迪对PSEG公司核电准备、影响和经验教训
（原文载于：http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/slides/2014/20140106b/denight-slides-20140106b.pdf ）
P1：Forecast vs. Actual
第一页：预测和实际
•Forecasts on October 29th at 6 pm called for:
–Additional rainfall of another ¼ - ¾”
–Winds through midnight will be sustained at 30-45 mph with gusts of 45-65 mph
–Overnight winds will be sustained at 15-30 mph with gusts of 30-50 mph
–Storm surge will be 3-6’ and will peak around midnight. Storm surge should recede by mid morning
•10月29日6：:0预测为:
–额外降雨1/4-3/4英寸
–午夜风速将持续在30-45英里/小时、阵风45-65英里/小时
–整夜风速将持续在15-30英里/小时、阵风30-50英里/小时
–风暴潮将达到3-6'，午夜将达到顶峰。上午风暴潮将减弱
P2:Forecast vs. Actual
第二页：预测和实际
•Actual weather from landfall at 8 pm through the early morning
–Rainfall was consistent with forecast
–Winds through the evening were 40-60 mph with gusts upon landfall of up to 90 mph
–Winds were sustained through the night precluding storm restoration to begin until 7 am
–Storm surge ranged from 11-13.6’, causing widespread flooding and devastation to the region
•从8:00登陆起早间实际天气:
–降雨与预测一致
–整夜风速持续为40-60英里/小时、登陆时高达90英里/小时
–风持续了整夜直至7:00开始风暴恢复
–风暴潮达到11-13.6'，导致洪灾泛滥。
P3：PSEG Nuclear Unit Status
第三页：PSEG公司核电站状态
•Hope Creek - 100% Rated Thermal Power
•Salem Unit 1- 100% Rated Thermal Power
•Salem Unit 2 (two days prior to Sandy’s arrival):
–Defueled, Full Core offload, in Spent Fuel Pool
–Defueled Mid Loop
–Single Source of Off-site power
–Major Equipment OOS
•2B Emergency Diesel Generator, 2B Vital Bus OOS
•2B 125V DC batteries
•21 SW Nuclear Header
•Hope Creek核电站——100%额定（热）功率
•Salem核电站#1机组——100%额定（热）功率
•Salem核电站#2机组（在桑迪到达前两天）
–卸料状态，全部堆芯卸出，装在乏燃料池内
–卸料中间回路
–仅依靠外电源（本人批注：柴油机应该是在检修状态）
–主设备00S
•2B应急柴油发电机，2B重要母线00s
•2B 125V直流蓄电池
•21 SW 核顶盖
P4：Salem and Hope Creek Flood Design
第4页：Salem和Hope Creek核电站防洪设计
（本人批注：上图右边标注了Salem和Hope Creek核电站的防洪设计情况，此两个电站在同一厂址区域，详细介绍见：http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/55e07e640101gszf
P5：Salem and Hope Creek Shutdown Criteria
第五页：Salem和Hope Creek核电站关停标准
•IF AT ANY TIME the river level is >98.5 ft, THEN INITIATE actions to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 6 hours and in Mode 5 within the next 30 hours.
•IF hurricane force winds are imminent, THEN INITIATE preparations such that the Unit is in Hot Standby (Mode 3) at least two hours prior to the projected arrival of hurricane force winds.
•一旦河水水位高于98.5英尺，就启动相关行动，在6小时内将机组置于第3类模式，在接下来的30小时内置于第5类模式。
•如果飓风级风即将发生，即启动相关准备（例如机组在预计飓风级别风抵达前至少2小时前将机组置于热备用状态（第3类模式））
P6：Salem and Hope Creek Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
第六页：Salem和Hope Creek核电站应急等级（EALs）
•Unusual Event (UE)
–Delaware River level reaches 99.5 feet at Salem units, 99.5 feet at Hope Creek
–Average Wind Speed >95 mph for any elevation
•alert – Escalation with UE conditions
–Visible damage to Safety Related Structures
•异常事件（UE）
–在Salem机组和Hope Creek机组位置的达拉维河水位达到99.5英尺；
–在任意海拔高度平均风速超过95英里/小时
•报警——扩大至UE条件
–安全相关建筑物可见损坏
P7：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3)
第七页：极端天气导则的执行——第一阶段（T-3）
•Operations
–Inspect station blackout equipment
–Verify remote shutdown panel communications
–Indication and switch alignment
–Hope Creek blockhouse sump pump staged
•运行
–检查电站停电设备
–检查遥控停机面板通讯
–指示灯和开关之列
–Hope Creek潜水泵准备好
P8：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines – Phase 1 (T-3)
第八页：极端天气导则的执行——第一阶段（T-3）
•Maintenance
–Protect spare equipment required for recovery
–Inspect/remove/secure outside areas for potential missiles
–Staging of sump pumps and sandbags
–Availability of emergency supplies like flashlights, potable water, etc.
•维修
–准备好用于恢复的背影设备
–检查/去除/加固室外区域潜在危险
–准备好潜水泵和沙包
–有效应急用品如防爆灯、饮用水等。
P9：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines - Phase 2 (T-2)
第九页：极端天气导则的执行——第二阶段（T-2）
•Site walkdowns
•Verifying water tight doors
•Emergency diesel generator availability
•Return Major Plant Equipment for Shutdown Safety
•Ensuring water intakes prepared for severe weather
•Address potential staffing requirement
•厂址巡查
•检查水闭门
•应急柴油机有效
•使得主要电厂设备安全停运
•确保用以极端天气准备的取水
•员工潜在需求的服装
P10：Staffing requirements
第十页：员工需求
only essential personnel req’d to report
–Specific responders from two ERO teams
–Operations Support Center (OSCs)
–Technical Support Center (TSC)
–Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
仅仅是需要报告的重要专业人员
–2个ERO（应急响应团队）专门反馈
–运营支持中心（OSCs）
–技术支持中心（TSC）
–应急操作设备（EOF）
P11：Implementation of Severe Weather Guidelines - Phase 3 (T-0)
第十一页：极端天气导则的执行——第三阶段（T-0）
–Close watertight doors
–Relocate personnel
–Implement preplanned sandbagging
–Relocate vehicles to shelter
–Establish Fire Protection command post
–Complete various Service Water Bay penetration repairs
–关闭水闭门
–安置人员
–执行事前计划的垒沙袋工作
–重新安置汽车以防护
–建立消防指挥部
–完成各种防渗水修复工作
P12：Superstorm Sandy impacts
第十二页：超强风暴桑迪的影响
•Hope Creek - Remained at 100%, HC output greater than demand on PJM
•Salem Unit 1 manually taken offline at 1:09 am (5 day forced outage)
–Four of the six circulating water pumps no longer available
–Heavy debris, waves resulted in Travelling water screens stopping
•Non-vital Switching Station lost due to water intrusion
–Loss of power to several buildings onsite
–Lost onsite intranet, phones, met tower data to Salem control rooms
•Hope Creek核电站——维持100%负荷，输出功率大于PJM（本人批注：美国一区域电力市场）的需求
•Salem核电站#1机组于下午1:09手动解列（5天的强制检修）
–6台循环泵中的4台不可用
–严重波浪，波浪导致进水闸门停用
•没有重要开关站因水的入侵停用
–厂内几座建筑物失电
–厂内网络、电话故障，接触塔数据到Salem控制室
P13：Staffing Requirements
第十三页：员工需求
•Suspended Salem Unit 2 refueling outage activities on Sunday evening, October 28
–All equipment, except SW header, returned to Operations
–Reactor Cavity flooded up to Refueling level for defense in depth
–All contractors left site that weekend
–First time in operating history to suspended refueling outage
•10月28日、星期六晚上，推迟Salem#2机组的换料大修
–所用设备，除了SW顶盖，重返运行；
–反应堆堆腔注水至换料水位用以纵深防御
–所用员工周末留在现场
–运行史上首次推迟换料大修
P14：Superstorm Sandy Lessons Learned
第十四页：超级风暴桑迪的经验教训
•Equipment Issues / Storm Preparations
–Substation enclosures are susceptible to water intrusion
–Lack of outage contingencies for loss of building capabilities
–Lack of adequate sleeping arrangements for essential personnel.
–Access road monitoring and shoring – extra fill / seawall
•设备问题/风暴准备
–开关站围墙易遭受水侵袭
–缺乏建筑物失电后的维修应变措施
–重要人员缺少额外睡眠的安排
–进城道路监护和支护——额外的填充/防波堤
P15：Lessons Learned – Root Cause
第十五页：经验教训——根本原因
•Abnormal Procedure Guidance
–Inadequate severe weather guidance in Abnormal procedure for wind speed, direction, grassing levels, tide, etc.
–Decision Making on unit power did not account for wave action effects
–Severe Weather Guide – No single designated information source for decision-making
•异常情况程序指导
–在关于风速、风向、潮等异常情况程序中增加极端天气（应对）导则
–关于机组功率的决策不要影响指挥行动
–极端天气导则——没有一个用于决策的设计信息源
P16：Lessons Learned – Corrective actions
第十六页：经验教训——纠正行动
•Previous Shutdown Criteria
–IF AT ANY TIME river level is >98.5 ft…
•Maximum Tide was 97.2 feet
–IF hurricane force winds are imminent...
•Maximum average wind speed was 59 miles per hour
•Wind direction shifted 180° in four hours directed at CWIS
•事前停机标准
–一旦河水水位高于98.5英尺...
•最高潮位97.2英尺
–如果风暴潮即将到来...
•最大平均风速为59英里/小时
•风向在4小时内偏转180度朝向CWIS
P17：Lessons Learned – Corrective actions
第十七页：经验教训——纠正行动
•New Shutdown Criteria
–CW intake degradation index
•Uses grassing, tide, wind speed and direction
•Guidance to shutdown as a composite
–If hurricane is to pass within 50 miles of site - shutdown
•新停运标准
–冷却水取水（安全）降级指引
•使用grassing（本人批注：专业词汇，不会）、潮位、风速和方向
•作为一项综合措施的停运导则
–如果飓风以时速50英里/小时的风速通过长治——（机组）停运
新闻投稿
