本文英文原文节选自美国能源部能源信息统计署《Annual Energy Outlook 2014 with projections to 2040》，译文为博主自译，未经译审。本人承诺尊重DOE网站的版权，不将该文和译文用于商业用途，仅供国内关注核电人士参考！若引用译文需标注出处！

博主微评：NRC采取了一个近中远期相结合、现场改进行动和法规修订制定相结合的体系性的严谨、务实的福岛应对行动，其系列改进行动和陆续出台的法规标准值得国内同行进一步研究。福岛核事故是核工业的一场灾难，但它带给了核工业进一步改进提升的启示，相信这些行动可以促进全球核行业安全业绩进一步提升。

LR4. U.S. response to the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi

LR4、美国应对福岛核事故

Since the March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. nuclear industry have been working to address issues related to the accident. The NRC and the U.S. nuclear industry initiated an immediate coordinated response to the accident, as well as long-term actions intended to assure the safety of operating and planned reactors in the United States. The ultimate cost of complying with NRC orders and proposed regulations and industry-led initiatives remains uncertain, as do the potential impacts on nuclear power plant operations. Although they are not specifically modeled in AEO2014, NRC actions and industry initiatives are being monitored by EIA so that potential costs and operational impacts can be included in future AEOs.

2011年3月日本福岛第一核电站事故以来，美国核管理委员会（NRC）和美国核工业一直致力于处理（该）事故相关问题。核管理委员会和美国核工业发起了即刻协调事故应对行动，并推动旨在确保美国在运和拟建核反应堆安全的长期的行动。符合NRC工作令和所建议的法规、行业主导的行动所带来的最终成本仍然是不确定的，对核电站运营的潜在影响也具不确定性。虽然他们不是专门为《AEO2014》进行专述，NRC的行动和核行业举措也被列入了EIA（美国能源信息统计署）的监督范围，这样潜在成本和运行影响可以包括在未来的年度能源展望(AEOs）中。

The NRC conducted a systematic and methodical review of its own processes and regulations in light of the accident at Fukushima. On July 12, 2011, the NRC’s Near-Term Task Force released its report, Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century . The report contains 12 recommendations, including both short- and long-term actions for consideration, and prioritizes the implementation of the recommendations.

NRC依据自己的流程和法规针对福岛核电站事故进行了系统的、有条理的审查。2011年7月12日，NRC近期工作小组发表报告《提高第二十一世纪反应堆安全建议》。该报告包含了12项建议，包括短期行动、长期行动以及优先考虑的建议执行事项等。

In order to address the short-term recommendations, the NRC issued three orders in March 2012 that require nuclear power plants to implement measures related to lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, as follows:

为了解决短期问题，NRC于2012年3月发出了三个工作令，要求核电厂实施福岛核事故教训的相关措施，如下：

• All boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and II containment systems must have reliable hardened containment venting capability to reduce pressure and hydrogen buildup. This may require improving or replacing existing containment ventilation systems .

•所有使用马克I和马克II型安全壳的沸水反应堆（BWR）必须有可靠的固化的安全壳通风能力以降低安全壳压力和氢气浓度。这可能需要改进或更换现有的安全壳通风系统。

• Reactors must have enhanced instrumentation installed to monitor water levels in their spent fuel pools in the event of an emergency .

•反应堆必须安装强化乏燃料池仪表以监测在应急事件情况下的水位。

• Nuclear power plants must be capable of responding to multiple simultaneous events and ensuring that reactors and spent fuel pools remain cooled. The order specifies a three-phase approach involving use of installed on-site resources, use of portable on-site equipment, and indefinite use of off-site resources .

•核电厂必须能够响应多个同时发生的事件并确保反应堆和乏燃料池保持冷却。工作令还指定了一个包括可使用安装在现场的电源、使用现场便携式设备以及无限期使用的场外电源等在内的三相（接入）方法。

The NRC stated that, in all cases, the existing fleet of reactors can continue operating safely while implementing the orders. The orders were effective immediately and included timetables for responses and actions.

NRC表示，在所有情况下，执行工作令后所有在运反应堆群都可以继续安全运行。工作令，包括应对和行动时间表在内均立即生效。

In the three orders listed above, the NRC required an integrated plan to be submitted by February 2013, with initial status reports due in 60 days. The NRC specified that operating reactors must complete modifications within two refueling cycles after submitting an integrated plan, or by the end of 2016, whichever comes first. Any reactor with a construction permit issued under 10 CFR Part 50 (e.g., Watts Bar Unit 2) was required to comply with the above orders prior to receiving an operating license. Any reactor issued a Combined Operating License (COL) under 10 CFR Part 52 (i.e., Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Summer Units 2 and 3) was required to implement all requirements in the orders before the initial fuel loading. Compliance assessments are underway at nuclear power plants. The requirements of the orders remain in place until superseded by other orders or rulemaking. As discussed below, NRC is considering or has initiated rulemaking on several topics, and some of the dates established in the original orders have been modified.

上述三个工作令中，NRC要求不迟于2013年2月提交一个综合计划并在60天内提交初始状态报告。NRC规定提交综合计划后，在运反应堆必须在两个换料周期内或2016年底前（以先到者为准）完成改造。依据10 CFR Part 50获颁了建造许可证的任何反应堆（例如，Watts Bar #2机组）在接受运营许可前必须符合上述工作令【译者备注，NRC原来的执照分为建造许可证和运营许可证，现改为发放建造运营联合许可证COL了】。任何依据10 CFR Part 52获颁建造运营联合许可证（COL）的反应堆（例如V.C.Summer#3、4机组和Vogtle#2、3机组）被要求在开始首炉装料前执行所有工作令要求。核电厂正在进行符合性评估。工作令要求在被其它指令或规则替代前保留合适状态（确保执行）。正如下面讨论的，NRC正在考虑或已经在若干重点开始制定规则，并且最初工作令中建立的部分（计划）日期已经进行了修改。

In November 2012, as an addition to the original order issued to address more robust containment venting systems, the NRC began considering whether to propose a rule that would require containment venting systems to filter all releases during an accident for boiling water reactors with Mark I and Mark II containments . If the NRC decides to pursue such a rulemaking, a final rule could be issued in 2017 .

2012年11月，如同最初工作令的一个附件用于处理更强大安全壳通风系统，NRC开始考虑是否提出一个规则，它将要求采用马克一型和马克二型安全壳的沸水堆的安全壳通风系统在事故期间过滤掉所有排放物（放射性）。如果委员会决定制定这样的规则，这个最终规则可能将于2017年发布。

Utilities continue to provide documentation to the NRC on equipment procured to respond to a prolonged loss of power at a reactor (station blackout) as well as spent fuel pool water level monitoring instrumentation. In March 2013, the NRC decided to proceed with a rulemaking to address station blackout mitigation . In its July 2013 regulatory basis document , the NRC noted: “One dual-unit site estimated that the order may cost approximately $25 million, while a second dual-unit site estimated the cost at $43 million.” The final rule is scheduled for issuance by December 2016.

公用事业继续就反应堆长时间失去电源（全厂失电）应对所用设备和乏燃料水池水位监测仪表事宜向NRC提供文件。2013年3月，委员会决定着手制定规则来处理全厂断电缓解问题。在其2013年7月监管基础文献中NRC说到：“一个双机组厂址按此指令预计可能耗资约2500万美元，当第二个双机组厂址估计费用在4300万美元。”最终规则将于2016年12月发布。

By June 2013, two detailed inspections (or “walkdowns”) had been completed at each reactor to evaluate potential seismic and flooding hazards. The NRC is in the process of auditing the results of the walkdowns. All flooding re-evaluations are due to the NRC by March 2015 . The NRC will review the analyses and issue a safety assessment for each site. For nuclear power plants requiring a seismic risk analysis, the NRC performed a prioritization of plants in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) and the Western United States (WUS). Plants in more seismically active WUS and CEUS locations will complete risk evaluations by June 2017, and those in less active CEUS locations will complete risk evaluations by December 2019 [41].

截至2013年6月，所有反应堆都完成了两项详细检查（或“逐项巡查”）以评估潜在的地震和洪水灾害。NRC正在进行逐项巡查结果的审计。2015年3月前NRC将完成所有的洪水再评估工作。NRC将针对每一个厂址审计其分析结论并签署安全性评估（意见）。考虑到核电厂都需要进行地震风险分析，NRC优先执行美国中东部（CEUS）和美国西部（WUS）的核电厂。地处中东部（CEUS）地震比较活跃地段和西部（CEUS）的电厂将于2017年6月前完成风险评估，那些（地震）不活跃的的中东部厂址将于2019年12月前完成风险评估。

In November 2013, the NRC announced proposed rulemaking language to “. . . strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response capabilities.” The final rule, which is likely to be issued in March 2016, is expected to address accident mitigation strategies; integration of accident mitigation procedures; identification of command and control roles during an accident; conduct of drills and exercises; training; and include severe accident situations in examinations for reactor operators. In its comments on the NRC’s draft regulatory basis , the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) estimated a cost of $17 million for the nuclear fleet— or $275,000 per unit—to develop and implement new training plans. NEI also estimated increased training costs of $250,000 per site per year and annual severe accident drill costs of $250,000 per site.

2013年11月，NRC宣布拟提议的法规语言”...加强和整合现场应急反应能力。”可能于2016年3月发布的最终法规，有望解决事故缓解策略；事故缓解过程的整合；事故发生过程中的指挥和控制角色的识别；训练、演习、培训开展；以及包括在反应堆操作员考试中的严重事故情况。在NRC法规草案基础的评论中，核能研究所（NEI）估计反应堆群将花费1700万美元或每台机组27.5万美元以开发和实施新的培训计划。NEI还估计每个厂址每年将增加25万美元，每年每个厂址增加的用于年度严重事故培训成本约25万美元。

In addition to the NRC actions described above, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and NEI formed a Fukushima Response Steering Committee to integrate and coordinate the industry’s response to the accident. In February 2012, the Steering Committee jointly released a report, The Way Forward: U.S. Industry Leadership in Response to Events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which discusses activities to oversee and coordinate responses to emergencies . INPO prepared a detailed report on post-accident events at Fukushima Daiichi [46], and on November 11, 2011, the detailed report was provided to the U.S. Congress, the NRC, and the U.S. nuclear industry. The nuclear industry, through NEI, developed its FLEX strategy—a comprehensive, flexible, and integrated plan to mitigate the effects of severe natural phenomena and to take steps to achieve safety benefits quickly . The FLEX approach, implemented in 2012, was informed by the industry’s response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Two regional response centers will be located near Memphis, Tennessee, and Phoenix, Arizona. From those regional response centers, critical emergency equipment can be delivered to nuclear power plants within 24 hours. The regional response centers are planned to be fully operational by August 2014 .

除了上述的NRC行动，电力科学研究院（EPRI），核电运行研究所（INPO），和NEI形成了福岛应对指导委员会以整合和协调行业对（福岛）事故的应对。2012年2月，指导委员会联合发布了一份报告《前进的道路：美国行业在应对福岛第一核电站事故的领导地位》，它讨论了监督行为和突发事件的协同应对。INPO准备了一份福岛第一核电厂事故后事件的详细报告，2011年11月11日，该详细报告提供给了美国国会、NRC和美国核工业。核工业通过NEI发布了它的FLEX战略——一个全面、灵活和集成的规划以降低严重自然现象的影响及采取措施尽快达到安全效益。Flex方法，在2012年执行时，核工业被告知用以应对2001年9月11日发生在美国的恐怖袭击。2个区域性应急中心将毗邻田纳西州的孟菲斯和亚利桑那州凤凰城。从这些区域响应中心出发，关键的应急设备可在24小时内交付给核电站。区域响应中心计划在2014年8月全面运营。

In addition to activities that focus on reactors and the utilities that operate them, the NRC has spent more than two years evaluating how best to respond to the first of the 12 recommendations made in the July 2011 Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident , which recommended establishment of a “logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.” Defense-in-depth is a layered approach to safety that involves the use of multiple redundant and independent safety systems. NRC’s evaluation of this recommendation was discussed publicly in January 2014 and included proposed actions on a policy statement that would detail, among other things, the decision criteria for ensuring adequate defense-in-depth. The proposed actions also identify the need to clarify the role of voluntary industry initiatives in the NRC regulatory process.

除了关注反应堆以及运行它们的公用事业行为外，NRC已经花了两年多的时间评估如何最好地应对2011年7月从福岛第一核电厂事故监督伸出中得出的近期任务行动审计提出的12项建议中的第一批任务，它建议建立一个“逻辑性的、系统性的、连贯性的监管框架，以适度平衡纵深防御和风险考虑的额外保护。”纵深防御是一个分层的安全方法，涉及多个冗余和独立的安全系统的使用。NRC就这项建议的评价于2014年1月被公开讨论，且包括在一项政策声明提议的行动内，该声明详述了在其他事项中确保足够的纵深防御的决策标准。该提议行动还识别了用以澄清NRC规制程序中行业的自愿行动角色的需求。

The ultimate cost to the nuclear industry of addressing Fukushima-related issues remains uncertain, as do the potential impacts on nuclear power plant operations. In a meeting with the NRC in April 2013, Dominion Energy estimated that the cost of post-Fukushima actions could be $30 to $40 million per unit and $180 to $240 million for its fleet of six units [51, 52]. AEO2014 does not include potential post-Fukushima effects on nuclear capacity and generation, but costs and operational impacts will be monitored for inclusion in future AEOs as NRC actions and industry initiatives progress.

对于核工业而言，为了解决福岛相关问题最终成本仍然有不确定性，同样的不确定性也存在对核电站运营的潜在影响。在2013年4月NRC的一次会议上，Dominion能源估计，福岛后行动的成本将高达3000万-4000万美元/机组，对于它的6个核反应堆群而言将需要1.8亿-2.4亿美元。《年度能源展望2014》（AEO2014）没有包括在核电装机和发电量上的后福岛潜在影响，但成本和运行的影响、NRC的行动和行业行动进展情况等将在未来年度能源展望中被监测。